Romantic Love

 Romantic Love

Romantic love, as I understand it, is the form of love appropriate to all and only couples. That is not to say that all couples are such that each loves the other in the romantic mode: some have never loved each other; others have loved each other, but no longer do. Neither is it to say that only couples are such that each loves the other, in the romantic mode: circumstances may prevent two lovers from being a couple (Heloise and Abelard). My claim is normative: whilst not every couple is a loving couple, every couple is such that it is appropriate, or fitting, that each loves the other, in the romantic mode; and whilst not every pair of romantic lovers is a couple, every pair of romantic lovers is such that it is appropriate, or fitting, that they are a couple. I cannot specify any condition that is necessary and sufficient for being a couple. A candidate condition would be that two people are, in some sense, set on “going through.

life together” (although not necessarily their whole lives together), but this condition is too vague to be especially informative. Many parents and children, and friends, and siblings, are likewise set on “going through life together”. And to beef up the proposed condition by adding “in the manner distinctive of couples” is to render it circular. For two people to be a couple, it is not necessary that they are in, or even that they have ever had, a sexual relationship. Neither is it necessary that they live together. It is not even necessary that either or both parties wish, or have wished, either to be in a sexual relationship, or to live together. Moreover, as far as I can see, these conditions are not, either severally or collectively, sufficient for being a couple. Does it matter that I elucidate romantic love in terms of a concept – the concept of a couple – that I cannot elucidate in terms of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for its exemplification? No, for we must have some shared understanding of that concept, because there is no serious disagreement about its extension. (Compare: it is hard to provide conditions necessary and sufficient for being a chair, but we all know a chair when, and only when, we see one). Any group of people who share a social circle, and who are all equally informed about the goings on within that circle, will agree about which pairs of people among the circle are, and are not, couples. More carefully, they will agree at least about the non-borderline cases: there can be borderline instances, as there can be borderline instances of almost all everyday concepts, but this does not impugn our understanding of such concepts.